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One of the distinctive features of American society from the revolution onwards was the
sustained development of the polity and the economy. Economic development can be measured
in rising per capita income, but more important aspects were the development of an integrated
and well organized market economy, the development of the most important forms of business
organization – the partnership and the corporation -- and the consolidation of secure property
rights in land and moveable wealth. Economic development was matched by political
development through a broader suffrage, the emergence of political parties at the state and
national level, hotly contested but generally fair elections, a reliable legal system, and increasing
ability to guide government decisions through democratic institutions. Economic, political, and
general historians have always suspected that the two development processes were intimately
connected. Economists have come to understand quite clearly that modern economic
development is not possible without modern political development, and vice versa, if not quite
understanding how they are connected. The United States should offer a rich laboratory for
understanding the dynamic interplay of economics and politics.
Traditionally, however, questions about social dynamics in the early republic have been
framed by the founding choices made at the national level. The ability of the founders to
construct a democratic republic capable of defending and expanding its territorial sovereignty,
providing security of property and persons to its citizens, and, until 1861, ensuring relative
stability of government institutions and policies constituted a bedrock for the subsequent
development of American society. The national history has strongly influenced our attempts to
understand American development since, from 1790 to 1860, national government structures and
policies basically stayed the same. The national constitution was amended just twice between2
1The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the 11
th amendment in 1795 concerned states and
judiciary, and the 12
th amendment in 1804 was a technical modification in the presidential
election system, the 13
th amendment banned slavery in 1965
1791 and 1865.
1 Policies with respect to public lands, taxation, the military, and internal
improvements (transportation) were often hotly debated, but underwent no fundamental change.
Policies regarding patents, banks and international trade did change, but not dramatically so, even
though arguments about policies were intensely argued as well. While history focuses on the
arguments, one major implication of the founding choices was an unexpectedly stable national
government policies.
Interplay is the result of action and reaction. If economic and political development are
connected, then political actions should lead to economic consequences, economic actors should
change their behavior and, in turn, pressure political actors to make political changes. Unlike the
static national government policies, state governments were deeply involved in actions, new
experiments, and fundamental changes that affected the economy from 1776 through 1860. State
political development was, in turn, affected by economic changes. Historians have always
known that a history written from the perspective of the national government is important, but
incomplete, since most of the political policies affecting economic development in the new
nation originated at the state level. The assumption has often been that the interplay between
capitalism and democracy at the state level followed the same pattern as at the national level.
Indeed, it is often implicitly assumed that the national level dominated the interaction between
economics and politics because of the central importance of national constitutional guarantees for
security of property and contract.
This paper argues the opposite: if we want to understand the relationship between3
political and economic development in the United States, then we need to understand American
history at the state level. It was at the state, not the national, level that the critical interplay
between political and economic development, between democracy and capitalism if you will,
occurred between the 1780s and 1840s and on into the late 19
th century. The papers in this
volume by Howard Bodenhorn and Robert Wright look closely at banking and corporations, two
areas of the economy in which the states were the primary government actors that exerted
profound influence over the economy. Symmetrically, the growing economy also posed
profound questions for democracy. Early Americans feared that their new democracies would not
be sustainable. It was by no means clear that governments could promote development without
corrupting democracy.
The states led the process of political and economic development. The first three sections
of the paper document the rapid and continuous state constitutional change, the persistent
expansion of democracy at the state level, and the relative inaction at the federal level. Then we
turn to the fears of early Americans that the energetic promotion of economic development
threatened new democratic institutions by using public power to promote private interests that
would derail and corrupt the political process. On the economic side, fundamental changes were
made in the nature of business organizations, both partnerships and corporations, the nature and
regulation of entry into markets, including financial markets, the ability of private firms to draw
on capital from public sources, and the structure of taxation. On the political side, fundamental
changes were made in constitutional provisions that specified the kind of economic activity state
and local governments could engage in directly, government relationships with private
organizations, the methods, procedures, and limits on the creation of government debts, and4
ultimately on the kinds of laws state governments could pass. Understanding how Americans
gradually learned over time how to create more powerful and productive private economic
organizations at the same time that they secured the democratic process from being unduly
influenced by those organizations is the fundamental story of this paper.
The national government faced the same challenges as the states, but was unable to
deliver significant investments in finance and transportation. The emphasis placed here on state
governments does not imply that states played a more important role than the national
government in the development of early 19
th century America: both were important. The role of
states has, however, been slighted by historians of all types and redressing the balance is
important. Understanding how America promoted political and economic development is
impossible if we ignore the states, since we get an incomplete picture of how American
institutions changed. Equally important, there has long been both a (raw) political and
(sophisticated) theoretical explanation of American development neatly conveyed in the motto of
The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, a standard bearer of the Jacksonian
Democrats, published from the late 1830s into the 1850s: “The Best Government is that which
Governs Least.” The intense political debate about how active a role the national government
should take, epitomized by the struggle between the Democrats and Whigs in the 1830s and
1840s but present from 1790 through to the Civil War, by and large resulted in a relatively
inactive national government. Undue focus on the national government can lead to simple
conclusion that American development was the result of inactive and quiescent government.
Almost all of the important constitutional development in the United States between 1787
and 1865 occurred at the state level, changes that can be documented in the state constitutions.5
Presenting that evidences makes up the bulk of this paper. A continuous interplay between the
people’s desire to promote economic development and secure democracy produced a long record
of institutional change. When the pieces are lined up correctly, it is easy to see the tension and
interplay. In the simplest terms, Americans feared that organized economic or political groups
posed a threat to democracy, the fear of faction so persuasively described by Madison in
Federalist paper #10. At the same time, Americans wanted to promote economic development
(although there were enormous differences about how that should be done) and saw the creation
of economic organizations as the best way to achieve those ends. The tension was particularly
acute in the area of financial and transportation infrastructure. The states figured out how to
resolve the tension. Their constitutional flexibility and innovation shows clearly when we look at
the right places in our history.
2. Constitutional Change
Between 1800 and 1900, the national government amended its constitution four times,
once to correct a defect in the procedures for electing the president and vice-president and three
times in the wake of the Civil War. During the same period, thirty states wrote new constitutions
when they entered the Union and 64 existing state constitutions were revised for a total of 94
complete constiutions. States also amended their constitutions hundreds of times during the
century.
Table 1 lists the dates of state constitutions, new and revised, for states in existence up to
1850. States are grouped by region: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South, Southwest, Northwest,
and the trans-Mississippi West. The columns reflect roughly twenty year time periods, except for6
the 1860s and 1870s which were particularly active constitutional times. There are four main
points to take away from the table.
First, states actively reconsidered constitutional arrangements in the 19
th century. Of all
the states in the table, only Massachusetts and New Hampshire did not revise its constitution at
least once between 1800 and 1900. In addition, only South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and California did not revise their constitution at least once
between 1800 and 1860.
Second, after a wave of constitution making and revising in the 1790s, New England
states were much less active. Connecticut and Rhode Island operated with revised versions of
the colonial charters until writing new constitutions in 1818 and 1843 respectively. Vermont was
the only other state to revise its constitution in 1836 and the Vermont changes were relative
small. Although New England states did amend their constitutions, the region as a whole stands
apart from the rest of the country when it comes to constitutions. New Englanders were willing
to change laws, without changing their underlying constitutions, where other states found it
necessary, or advisable, to change their constitutions and the laws. New England exceptionalism
appears often in what follows.
Third, the most active period for constitutional revision stretched from the early 1830s
through the early 1850s. States in the South and in New England were less likely to revise their
constitutions in this period, all other states replaced their constitutions at least once. It was in the
1840s, in particular, that changes in constitutional provisions with respect to the economy and
public finance, changed that later spread through the rest of the country.
Fourth, the 1860s and 1870s were a period of intense constitutional revision in South.7
This was triggered by secession in 1861 and 1862; the return of states to the Union in 1865 and
the period of reconstruction up to 1877; and a third wave of Southern constitutional reaction to
reconstruction constitutions after 1877. Many of the constitutional reforms of the 1840s were
adopted in Southern constitutions under reconstruction, and those provisions were generally not
removed in later Southern constitutions.
In short, states actively considered and reconsidered their constitutional arrangements
throughout the 19
th century. They were not content to rest on the laurels of their revolutionary
constitutions. As we will see, after changing their constitutions in the early 19
th century to make
them more democratic, by widening the suffrage and making officials more responsive to direct
selection by voters, they engaged in another round of constitutional changes that reflected the
changing relationship of their democratic polities to their growing economies.
3. Suffrage and Democracy
Control over elections in the early republic was left completely up to the states. Table 2
reports restrictions on suffrage at the state level. All of the original states, with the exception of
New Hampshire and Vermont, imposed either property or tax paying requirements for voting in
the 1770s. Kentucky imposed no requirements (except color) when it entered in 1792, Tennessee
had a property requirement when it entered in 1796 and Ohio had a tax paying requirement when
it entered in 1802. Ohio was the last new state to impose property or tax paying requirements
when it entered the Union, every state after that allowed free, white, male, adult suffrage in their
initial constitutions. Existing states began opening suffrage by reducing or eliminating
requirements, as shown in the table. By 1855, only Rhode Island, New York, and South Carolina
still imposed a property requirement and, as Keyssar notes (2000, appendix A.3), Rhode Island8
2The argument in this section is developed in full in Wallis and Weingast, 2005.
exempted native-born citizens from the requirement, New York’s property restrictions applied
only to African Americans, and South Carolina offered a residency alternative to the property
qualification.
The movement toward free, white, male suffrage was matched by a movement toward
direct election of state officials. By the 1850s almost all the states elected their governors by
direct popular vote, only half had done so in their original constitutions. States moved to
eliminate extra-legislative bodies with the power to review laws or propose constitutional
amendments, such as the Council of Revision in New York or the Council of Censors in
Pennsylvania and Vermont.
Beginning in the 1830s, states also began selecting judges by popular election, taking the
power of appointment and approval from legislatures and governors. Table 3 lists the years when
states considered electing judges, sometimes accepting and sometimes rejecting the idea (taken
from Shugerman, 2008).
After independence, American states moved steadily towards more democratic
institutions: wider suffrage and a direct selection of more government office holders through
popular election.
4. Federal Inactivity
Between 1790 and 1860, the federal government spent only $60 million on transportation
improvements and chartered two banks.
2 Over the same period that state and local governments
spent over $450 million and chartered thousands of banks. Why was the federal government
unable to make transportation investments? The federal government not only stood to gain from9
3Nettels, 1924, found 117 grants by Congress that funded federal transportation projects,
and discusses a large number of bills that were proposed but failed of passage. Feller, 1984,
details the long association of proposals to use revenues from public land sales with attempts to
obtain federal financing for internal improvements.
tying the nation more closely together through a system of transportation, the federal government
could be expected to be a more efficient provider of such investments. The federal government
was larger, in fiscal terms, with well established domestic and international credit (after the
1790s), and the federal government could internalize the external benefits of transportation
investments. When New York built the Erie canal, many of the benefits of the canal accrued to
residents of the Ohio river valley in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois who were able to ship their good
to the eastern seaboard via the canal. All of those benefits could, in principle have been
internalized by a national system of internal improvements.
The problem wasn’t lack of effort. As Goodrich (1960) and Larson (2000) both
document, Congress continually wrestled with proposals to involve the federal government in
transportation projects.
3 Even Thomas Jefferson, in his second inaugural, suggested that a
national system of transportation improvements be considered, leading the to famous Gallatin
plan. Gallatin was Jefferson’s secretary of the Treasury, and his proposed system of eight major
and several minor projects would have tied the nation together, both north and south, and east
and west, at an estimated costs of only $25 million. Why was Gallatin’s plan rejected?
Democracy.
The major obstacle was the competing interests of geographic areas: the unwillingness of
one area to incur costs for projects that would benefit other areas. For example, in the debate
over the building the Cumberland Road, which the federal government was obligated to build10
4Goodrich, 1960, p. 45. See Larson, 2001, pp.
5”[John Quincy] Adams’s charge that the national program was overthrown by what he
called “the Sable Genius of the South is therefore a great over-simplification.” Goodrich, 1960,
p. 46. Nettels, 1924, focuses on the importance of the West’s growing voting power and
awareness of their collective interests as the key factor that forced a decision about the national
government’s role in transportation improvements early in the Jackson administration.
because of promises it made when Ohio was admitted to the Union (so there was no
constitutional question that the road was going to be built), the issue was where the road would
be located. Throughout the debates over siting the road, geographic rivalries stood in the way of
the adoption of specific route. One Maryland congressman declared that Pennsylvania seemed
more inclined “to put a mountain in the middle of the Cumberland road than to repair it.”
4
Opposition to the Maryland route, for example, came primarily from Pennsylvania and Virginia.
When sectional rivalries dominated the debate, as they sometimes did, it was the rivalry between
the east and west that mattered, not the north and south.
5
How were these centrifugal forces inherent in democracy to be overcome? One way was
to charter a privileged corporation to provide the public good so that taxes would not have to be
raised on anyone. This mitigated the opposition of regions that paid taxes but received little or
no benefits. Both the first and second Banks of the United States were created by giving a
charter to a small group of investors and guaranteeing them control over federal financial
business. The federal government investment in the stock of both banks was financed by loans
from the banks themselves. No federal taxes were raised to create or invest in the banks, in fact,
both banks paid a nice dividend regularly into the federal treasury. But both Banks generated an
enormous amount of political opposition based on fears that the Banks were powerful
configurations of private interests that would use their power to dominate the polity: the first11
6Goodrich, (1960), p. 40. See Malone, Opening the West, and Senate Executive
Document 196, 47
th Congress, 1
st Session, “Statement of the Appropriations and Expenditures for
Public Buildings, Rivers and Harbors, Forts, Arsenals, Armories and Other Public Works from
March 4, 1789 to June 30, 1882.” Malone’s book analyzes the information in the Report. He
comes up with a total of $54 million on transportation expenditures. Our calculations total $60
million. We have chosen to go with our total and have been unable to determine where Malone
derived his $54 million total from.
Bank at its origins in the 1790s, the second Bank when its charter was renewed in 1832.
Fears over organized economic interests, articulated clearly in Washington’s farewell
address, suggest that the struggles over the Banks were a good indicator of the stiff opposition
that any nationally chartered corporation would face in Congress. Building transporation
infrastructure by creating privileged corporations appeared to be beyond the capacity of the
federal government. Alternatively, the federal government could borrow the money and hope
that revenues from the transportation improvement would repay the bonds (that was how the
transcontinental railroads were financed), but there was little support for peace time federal
borrowing in the early 19
th century.
The importance of geographic and fiscal factors is illuminated by the two types
transportation investments that could command a majority of votes in Congress and were
successfully pursued by the federal government. The first type was funding small, geographically
diverse projects continued on an annual basis. Every state got something. Lighthouse
construction began with the first Congress in 1790, with the addition of roads in 1802, rivers in
1824, harbors in 1824, and the first “rivers and harbors” bill in 1826.
6 Small omnibus lighthouse,
roads, and rivers and harbor legislation account for $41 million of the $60 million in federal
transportation expenditures between 1790 and 1860. Funding for small and scattered rivers and
harbors type of transportation projects was continuous and, with the exception of Jackson’s12
7The arrangement was an explicit deal in which Congress agreed to build roads to and
within Ohio in return for Ohio’s promise not to tax federal lands for five years after they were
sold to private individuals. Larson (2002), 54-55.
8Goodrich, 1960, pp. 24-26.
1830s vetoes, never frustrated by the president.
The second important federal initiative, and the second most important in fiscal terms,
began in 1802 with the enabling act admitting Ohio to statehood. This act set aside five percent
of land sales revenues in Ohio for the “building of public roads” to and within the state of Ohio.
7
The Ohio legislature asked that three percent of the funds be expended inside Ohio and Congress
agreed. The “two percent” fund for roads leading to Ohio began to accumulate, and in 1805
Congress authorized a survey of the route for the National, or Cumberland, Road. Construction
began in 1808, and continued into the 1850s, and accounting for $6.8 million in expenditures.
8
Similar land funds in other states, along with grants of acreage to states, account for $10 million
in expenditures. Together, rivers and harbor improvements and state land funds, amounted to
$58 million of the total of $61 million in federal transportation investments in the antebellum
period.
River and harbor projects worked in a democracy because they provided something for
everyone. Each state was able to get its share of rivers and harbor appropriation. If a state
wanted to it could bargain away its river and harbor money for some advantage in another piece
of legislation. The land funds built roads out of out of land sales revenues. Presumably these
funds paid for themselves, as land sales in the states who received the funds would be more
vigorous because the roads were being built.
Confirmation of such political forces were at work can be found in three successful13
attempts to get Congress to pass funding for a general system of transportation improvements
that were eventually vetoed or nullified by presidents. Henry Clay of Kentucky shepherded each
bill through Congress, in 1816, 1831, and 1841. The first bill, the Bonus Bill, was tied to the $2
million bonus the second Bank of the United States paid for its charter and the expected flow of
dividends from the bank stock the federal government owned. Clay and Calhoun proposed that a
fund be established with the money to distribute among the states to finance transportation
projects. After Congress got through with Clay and Calhoun, the fund had been changed to a
formula: each state would get a share of the bonus (or dividends) equal to its share in the
Congressional allocation (2 Senators + Representatives). Small states would get slightly more
per capita than large states, but there would be no discretion in the allocation of funds.
Something for everyone. President Madison unexpectedly vetoed the Bonus Bill on his last day
as president.
In 1831, and again in 1841, Clay pushed bills through Congress allocating the residual
revenues from federal land sales, after the costs of administering the public land process, to the
states on a Congressional allocation formula. The 1831 bill was part of the compromise that
ended the Nullification Crisis, but Andrew Jackson double crossed Clay and pocket vetoed the
distribution bill. The 1841 legislation was part of the Land Act of 1841, which made preemption
the general federal land policy from that time forward. The distribution provision would lapse if
tariffs were raised beyond a specific level, and President Tyler scotched the deal by raising
tariffs.
The presidential vetoes are remarkable in light of the Ohio enabling act. Similar14
9Terms of the other enabling acts varied slightly, but contained the same principles. See
Gates (1968). The Michigan enabling act in 1837 did not contain fund provisions.
provisions were included in the enabling acts of every state that entered the Union after Ohio.
9
The Ohio enabling act clearly authorized the federal government to redistribute funds from one
revenue source, sale of public lands, to another expenditure purpose, public roads (that were not
post roads which were explicitly authorized in the Constitution). The Ohio act authorized the
construction of public roads within one state, with the consent of the state. As president Madison
had signed enabling acts for states that implemented exactly the same type of legislation that
Madison vetoed in the Bonus Bill. Madison and Jackson vetoed the Bonus and Distribution bills
as unconstitutional, despite those bills containing exactly the same procedures and policies as the
state enabling acts.
Despite the strong and persistent calls for a national transportation system, the operation
of democratic forces at the federal level prevented much from being done. What was done
amounted only to a collection of small and scattered projects.
5. Democratic Dilemmas
The United States has, since the first state constitutions were written in 1776, always been
a republic, which James Madison defined as “a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place.” If by democracy we mean, as Madison defined “a society consisting
of a small number of citizens who assemble and administer the government in person,” then the
United States has never been a democracy, except perhaps in some of its local governments. If a
democratic republic is a society with a government made up of representatives and offices, where
selection of representatives and office holders is by direct election of all duly certified citizens,15
10Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, 2001, p. 46, in the Liberty Press’s reprint of the Gideon
edition of the Federalist Papers.
11The quote is from page 42. In the penultimate paragraph of paper #10 he again warned
that “factious leaders” had kindled a flame in their states, but that “a rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,
will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it...” (p. 48)
then the United States started out as a republic with some democracy and gradually evolved into
a democratic republic. Democracy could be dangerous. As Madison’s definition of democracy
in the Federalist papers continued, democracy “can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.
A common passion or interest till, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a
communication and concert, results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to
check the inducement to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual.”
10 Would a
democratic republic be any better?
Madison laid out the dangers of tyranny by the majority in Federalist #10 and how an
extended republic could mitigate the dangers of faction. He clearly stated that such fears were
justified by the experience of the states up until 1787: “Complaints are every where heard from
our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and or
public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are to often decided, not according
to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
foundation, the evidence of well known facts will no permit us to deny that they are in some
degree true.”
11 The charge that the original state constitutions set up governance institutions that
were too democratic, that they allowed too much control to rest in the hands of legislatures16
12Gordon Wood (1969) bought Madison’s argument that the state constitutions gave too
much unchecked power to legislatures, although Marc Kruman’s (1997) argument that state
constitutions were as keenly aware of the power of government and of legislatures in particular,
seems persuasive to me.
13As Quentin Skinner noted, in the late 18
th century tyranny represented a very clear state
of affairs: “These writers are no less insistent, however, that a state or nation will be deprived of
its liberty if it is merely subject or liable to having its actions determined by the will of anyone
other than the representatives of the body politic as a whole. It may be that the community is not
as a matter of fact governed tyrannically; its rulers may choose to follow the dictates of the law,
so that the body politic may not in practice be deprived of any of its constitutional rights. Such a
state will nevertheless be counted as living in slavery if its capacity for action is in any way
dependent on the will of anyone other than the body of its own citizens.” Liberty Before
without sufficient checks and balances has flavored our view of early state constitutions ever
since.
12 Since most of the constitutional changes discussed in this paper limited or modified the
capacity or procedures of state legislatures, this explanation needs to be kept in mind.
On the other side, Madison and the founders also feared tyranny of the minority. Tyranny
of the minority was rooted in fears of faction, which Madison defined as “a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, out of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the country.” (p. 43) Factions were groups, however
organized, that pursued their own interests to the detriment of the larger society (so whether a
group was a faction or not was, to a certain extent, in the eye of the beholder). Earlier republics
were not democracies, but contained competing groups of people, usually powerful people,
whose interests needed to be kept in balance to prevent civil war, violence, and tyranny.
The key to good government was mixing the interest of different groups, so that the
interest of each group would keep any one group from seizing control and tyrannizing the
excluded groups.
13 Polybius, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Harrington, and Montesque had all written17
Liberalism, p. 49.
14The classic statement of this hypothesis about the causes of the Revolution in Bailyn,
1969. For Whig thinking in Western political thought see Pocock 1973; for Whig thinking in
Britain see Robbins, 1959; and for a general survey of Whig thought in America see Shalhope’s
review articles, 1972 and 1982.
how a mixed government could balance competing factions and prevent tyranny. In 18
th century
Britain, these ideas coalesced into what came to be known as Whig or Commonwealth theory. In
the Whig’s view, the British constitution protected the interests of British citizens because of a
balance between the interests of the one, the few, and the many represented in the King, the
House of Lords, and the House of Commons. The Whig’s charged that British constitution was
being corrupted over the course of 1700's by an expansion of royal authority and influence in the
House of Commons. The King and his ministers used the granting of economic privileges, stock
in the Bank of England, shares of the national debt, pensions and offices to members of
Parliament in return for their political support. A political faction (the King) used the granting of
economic privileges to suborn the independence of Parliament, obtained complete control of the
government. The inevitable result would be tyranny. So went at least part of the justification for
the American Revolution.
14
One result of this way of thinking about how government worked was that the Founding
Fathers feared the dangers to liberty presented by organized interests in general and, in particular,
any close links between political parties (or factions) and economic corporations. They were
paranoid – to use Bailyn’s phrase – about the possibility that political factions would use
organized interest as a tool to subvert democracy. These fears were not merely muttered under
the breath of a few elite members of the Constitutional Convention, they were broadcast18
15In an earlier paper, Wallis, 2006, I used the term “systematic corruption” to denote
Whig fears that a faction would use political manipulation of the economy to secure political
power, in contrast to the modern notion of “venal corruption” in which economic interests distort
the political process to obtain economic benefits.
16For estimates and counts of the number of corporations for the U.S. see Wright 2008,
for Britain Harris 2000, for France Freedeman 1979, and the comparative work of Guinnane,
Harris, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, 2007 and Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2004 and 2005.
wholesale from the 1770s up through the 1850s. The Founders worried that political factions
would use the creation of economic and other privileges to create interests that could be used to
dominate the government. They were much more concerned that politics would corrupt
economics than our modern concerns that economics would corrupt politics.
15
Other papers in this volume trace the development of political parties, the business
corporation, banks, and the financial system in general. Given their deep fear of organized
interests, of parties and corporations, as threats to liberty and democracy, it is curious that by
1850 the United States came to have the world’s first mass political parties, ten times more
corporations than Britain and France combined, and the first institutions that allowed free and
open access to the corporate form.
16 Something had to give somewhere before 1850. Ideas about
factions and governments must have changed, but there is little evidence of these changes in the
national debates or national policies.
A key to understanding the American experience is to realize that Americans did not
really understood how democracy would actually work in 1776 or 1787. No one could have
understood how democracy worked because no democracy on the scale of the United States had
ever existed before. As Americans tried to use their governments to accomplish widely shared
goals, like increasing the value of land through investments in transportation and finance, aspects19
17For estimates of the impact of transportation costs on the price of land see Coffman and
Gregson, 1998; Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss 1998; Wallis, 2003.
of how democracy worked became apparent to them. In order to create transportation and
financial infrastructure, Americans needed to create small well organized groups. Given their
predisposition to fear organized interests, the creation of such groups raised alarms and fears that
the government was being corrupted, systematically corrupted in the sense that the organized
economic groups would serve as tools for assembling a political majority. How those fears were
relieved through changes in the constitutional structure of state governments is the story of this
paper.
6. Democracy and Development: The Example of Canals
Let me begin with the example of a canal. Canals dramatically reduced overland
transportation costs. Because farm products could be shipped to market much more cheaply, the
construction of a canal into a region without existing water transportation raised the farm gate
price of farm products and increased the value of farm land commensurately.
17 Given the wide
distribution of land ownership in the United States, many people were interested in building
canals. But it wasn’t easy for a democratic republic to build a canal. Canals were geographically
specific investments. Only people living in close proximity to the canal received direct benefits.
Yet if a state attempted to build a canal, all taxpayers potentially had to pay higher taxes. Since
most voters expected higher taxes and little or no benefits from the canal, they and their
representatives voted against the canal.
Scenarios like this played out in the band of northern states that attempted to build canals20
18For the Camden and Amboy story see Cadman, 1949.
in the 1810s, 1820s, and 1830s, stretching from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia on the eastern seaboard and west into Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Canal proponents
were concentrated among people who stood to benefit directly from the canal, typically because
they owned land on or near the canal. Canal opponents were either people who stood to lose
directly from the canal or people who worried that their taxes would increase. For example, in
New York opposition to the Erie canal included farmers on Long Island who opposed building a
canal into western New York that would increase competition, but also merchants in New York
city who feared higher taxes. The second group turned out to be spectacularly wrong about the
Erie canal, which helped make the fortune of New York merchants.
One possible solution to the impasse was to follow the existing European pattern of
chartering a privileged corporation to undertake the project. The corporation might be given a
monopoly on transportation services along the canal route, help in obtaining property through
eminent domain proceedings, favorable access to credit, and perhaps guarantees of limited public
funds. In return for their privileges, shareholders in the private company would endeavor to
build and operate the canal. The interests of the private actors was coordinated with the public
welfare through granting privileges. No taxes needed to be raised, muting opposition from
potential taxpayers. The deal could be even sweeter for taxpayers if the corporation promised to
grant an ownership share to the state. Rather than paying taxes, voters might enjoy a stream of
dividends from the canal. Something like this arrangement was how New Jersey encouraged the
construction and operation of the Camden and Amboy railroad connecting New York and
Philadelphia.
1821
19For events in Indiana and Illinois see Wallis, 2003; for Ohio see Scheiber, 1969.
Another possibility was for those who benefitted most from the canal to offer to pay a
higher share of the taxes. This is how the deadlock over the Erie canal was ultimately resolved in
New York in 1817, the counties along the canal route agreed that to pay a property tax surcharge
in the event that the canal fund ran out of money (Miller, 1962). In Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois
part of the deal leading to the passage of legislation committing the state to borrow money and
build a canal(s), was a change in property taxation. All three states had previously levied a per
acre tax on land (graduated by the value of land), which meant that farm land bore the largest
burden of the tax. In Indiana, for example, most settled farm land in the 1830s was in the
southern part of the state along the Ohio river. Southern farmers opposed the Wabash and Erie
canal, which served the western and northern part of the state. The farmers had the most land to
tax and the least to gain from the canal. In 1836, Indiana moved to an ad valorem property tax,
which shifted the burden of taxation from farm land more towards towns and urban areas (who
were agitating for the canals). Under the ad valorem tax system, land nearer the canal bore a
greater share of the tax burden. Indiana set out on its mammoth system of internal improvements
in January of 1836, the same month they switched to the ad valorem property tax.
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A third option was not to raise taxes at all. After the positive experience of the Erie
canal, which began construction in 1817 and before its completion in 1825 was already returning
a steady revenue to the state of New York (which owned and operated the canal), other states
began funding canal projects in the anticipation that revenues from the canal would eventually be
available to service bonds issued to cover construction costs. By borrowing a bit more than the
cost of building the canal, the state could use borrowed funds to pay bond interest in the early22
20The standard work on government transportation investments in Goodrich, 1960; which
is now supplemented by Larson, 2001.
years of the project, then redeem the bonds when the canal came on line. This method of
financing did not entail raising taxes, but it did entail the taxpayers incurring a contingent
obligation to repay the bonds if canal profits did not materialize. Taxpayers also stood to gain,
however, since any canal profits left over from servicing canal bonds would go into the general
fund of the state and enable other taxes to be reduced. This is what had happened in New York,
which was able to eliminate the state property tax in the 1820s as revenues from the Erie canal
came on line. This method of financing canal construction through borrowing and anticipating
canal revenues was used in Pennsylvania and Maryland in the 1820s, and interestingly by New
York in the 1830s when it decided to expand its canal network.
20
The central feature of all these finance schemes was to shift the benefits and burdens of
government policy in ways that affected voters directly. Only if a majority of the voters, or their
representatives, felt that they benefitted from the canal when both benefits and taxes were taken
into account, could legislation funding a canal pass a state legislature. This is how democracy
actually worked.
Canals, railroads, and banks were all potentially large investments that state governments
could make. Many local groups sought to promote economic development through local
promotion (see Majewski, 2000), but only a state could charter a corporation. The financial
resources of local governments were limited, particularly in frontier areas in the west. The
pressures on state governments to deliver these important public goods was high, but so were the
dangers. First, as discussed, Americans were always suspicious of organized economic interests23
in the form of a corporation. The manipulation of economic interests through corporate
chartering to advance the fortunes of a political faction was an essential danger to a republic in
Whig political theory. The opportunity to trade privileges for tax revenues, however, proved to
be enticing for American voters and taxpayers. Borrowing offered an even greater danger. A
faction might convince voters and taxpayers to extend state credit, either to a private corporation
or a public entity, to build or finance an investment in which most of the benefits would go to the
minority faction, in the hopes that the same minority would bear the burden of repaying the debt.
Second, It turned out that democracies were neither capable of correctly evaluating the
costs and benefits of such proposals, nor was democracy particularly good at turning such
proposals down. Whether improvement efforts were the result of corruption, excessive
optimism, or naivete, by the 1830s American states found themselves deeply engaged in such
projects. After 1839, their large debts came back to haunt states and taxpayers.
6. What states did
With the coming of independence, the United States turned its economic focus and
energies of the country inward. The major economic opportunities were within the United
States, not outside of it, and the most important and potentially profitable investments were in
transportation and finance. The process of opening the west required enormous resources. The
role of states in finance and transportation far outstripped the national government in importance.
The financial system that arose between 1790 and 1860 was based on banks not only chartered by
state governments, but in some cases owned by state governments. Nine out of every ten dollars
spent on public transportation investment came from state and local governments. Banking was
always under the control of state governments, with the exception of the two Banks of the United24
21Fenstermaker provides detailed information on the chartering of state banks before
1837.
22Sylla, Legler and Wallis, 1987, and Wallis, Sylla, and Legler, 1997 provided
information on state banks and their importance to state revenues.
States, and it was not until 1863 that the national government took an active role in chartering
and regulating banks. State governments were at the center of the development process.
There were no banks in America before the revolution. States began chartering banks in
the 1780s and 1790s. By the 1830s there were over 600 state chartered banks with a capital of
over $400 million dollars.
21 A corporate charter often, although not always, endowed the bank
with limited liability, which was important to bankers whose profits came mainly from
borrowing money in the form of bank notes. The legal ability to issue bank notes soon became a
privilege that required a bank charter. The first bank charters in the eastern states often gave the
state ownership shares in the bank as part of the cost of obtaining the charter. Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina all came to hold a financial
interest in banks in this way. Most early banks were chartered as public utilities. The rational
ran along the traditional European lines: the charter was an explicit exchange of a privilege for a
public service. That dividends on bank stock were an important element in the revenues of state
governments in the east was an added bonus.
22 These banks were often opposed by anti-bank or
anti-corporation groups, but they were fiscally attractive. Because the banks generated revenues,
they lowered state taxes.
Once a state acquired an ownership interest in one bank, it faced conflicting incentives
when asked to charter a second bank. The profitability of a bank depended, in part, on
competition. As more banks were chartered, rates of return on the capital invested in individual25
23See Bodenhorn, 2000, p. 63 and 2003.
banks declined. Existing banks opposed the formation of new banks, but states were constantly
asked to open new banks, particularly in developing areas where financial systems were primitive
(for example, the western parts of New York and Pennsylvania in the 1810s.) States that held
large amounts of stock in existing banks were less likely to charter new banks, as happened in
Pennsylvania. Other states, like Massachusetts, decided to sell their bank stock and tax bank
capital. States that taxes bank capital tended to have many more, and smaller, banks. (Wallis,
Sylla, aand Legler, 1997) The interaction of a state’s fiscal interest and the way states regulated
bank entry through their chartering policies is an early example of the interaction between
political and economic forces.
By the 1810's all of the states on the eastern seaboard were promoting or involved in
banking in some way. In places like New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston many
groups of businessmen aspired to have a bank. In these places, states could sell bank charters
and receive substantial revenues from doing so. In per capita terms, there were more banking
services in the northeast than in the rest of the country: more bank notes per capita, more bank
credit, more bank capital, etc.
23 Moving west and south from the northeast, however, the size and
sophistication of commercial centers decreased (the exception was New Orleans), the number of
banks decreased, the number of farmers increased, but the need for banking services did not
decline. States in the south and west wanted banks just as much as New Englanders, but the low
density of population, the high share of farmers, and the geographic concentration of crops meant
that banking was riskier. Banks in Mississippi, for example, made loans on cotton, both directly
to farmers to plant crops and by discounting bills of exchange to facilitate getting the crop to26
24The numbers for Mississippi and Michigan are larger because of the creation of banks in
1835 and 1836.
market. If the cotton crop failed or cotton prices collapsed, all the banks in Mississippi were in
trouble. The ability to diversify banking risk in Mississippi was limited, unlike banks in major
eastern commercial centers with many opportunities to diversify. The same was true in the
northwest, where markets for wheat, corn, and other grains dominated.
Economic conditions determined political options. Conditions in the south and west were
less conducive to banking and potential bankers were not willing to pay states for charters. States
responded in two way. First, states invested their own funds in banks, providing bankers with
larger amounts of public capital (eastern states usually received bank stock as part of the charter
process, and did not put state funds into the bank.) States did not raise current taxes to invest in
banks, however. Typically states chartered banks and then bought stock in the bank, paying for
their investment by issuing state bonds which were given to the bank. The banks were,
supposedly, responsible for servicing the state bonds.
Second, since states held large ownership shares in the banks, there were fewer banks and
the banks tended to be larger. Table 4gives the number of banks, total capital, and capital per
bank for five regions in 1837. Western states had many fewer banks. Ohio and Louisiana were
the only states west of the Appalachians with more than ten banks, and they were the two oldest
and most developed western states by the 1830s. Most frontier states had four or fewer banks.
24
Southern states in general had larger banks than northern states, but banks overall were much
larger in the west than in the east. Banks in the southwest had ten times the average capital of
banks in New England.27
25The 148% figure in Illinois is the result of a large state investment in 1837, which
occurred after the figure on bank capital was collected in January. The same is true for Alabama.
The last three columns of the table provide some insight into state investment in banks in
the west. Column 4 gives the amount of state debt incurred to invest in banks up 1837. Only
states in the frontier south and west borrowed money to invest in banks. Column 5 gives state
investment as a share of total bank capital. With the exception of Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan
state governments provide more than half of bank capital in each of these states.
25 State
involvement was critically important to the development of banks in the south and west. Column
6 gives the share of all state borrowing that went to investments in banks. We’ll return to this
shortly.
The First and Second Banks of the United States were extremely important to the
development of American financial systems. They spanned the country with their branches,
provided a uniform paper currency, and stabilized the conduct of national financial activities.
But they were not the only, or even the most important elements of the banking system that
developed in the early 19
th century. By 1836, state chartered banks had ten times the capital of
the Second Bank. When the Second Bank lost its charter, it was quickly rechartered as the Bank
of the United States of Pennsylvania. The banking system continued to develop without a
national bank, and there is no reason to believe that the banking system would not have
developed before 1836 if there had not been a national bank, although the system would have
looked somewhat different.
State involvement in transportation investment has as a long history as well. By the
1780s, states were chartering private companies, providing subsidies, and purchasing stock in28
0.The classic history of government involvement in transportation remains Goodrich 1960, which
has been supplemented by Larson, 2001.
canal, bridge, road, and turnpike companies.
26 Virginia chartered the Potomac Company and the
James River Company in 1785 and the Dismal Swamp Company in 1790. In 1792, New York
chartered two companies, the Western Inland Lock Navigation Company and the Northern Inland
Lock Navigation Company, to open canals to Lake Ontario in the west at the St. Lawrence in the
north via Lake Champlain. Maryland chartered the Chesapeake and Delaware canal in 1799. By
1811, Pennsylvania had spent $825,000 to build turnpikes. Massachusetts also invested in
turnpikes. Unlike their investments in banks, however, transportation projects were rarely
profitable investments for state governments. For a few brief years around 1805, it appeared the
national government might get involved in transportation. Jefferson’s second inaugural message
led Congress to ask the Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, to prepare a report laying out a
possible system of internal improvements. Gallatin’s famous report proposed a network of
canals that would have connected the disparate parts of the country at a cost of over $20,000,000.
Most of the projects envisioned in the report were eventually carried out in one form or another
by state and/or private interests, but the national government spent very little on transportation
before the 1820s.
Despite national inaction, there was widespread support for internal improvements. In
1811, the New York legislature authorized the issue of $5,000,000 in state bonds to build a canal;
a plan sidetracked by the outbreak of the War of 1812. Virginia created a Board of Public works
in 1816. In 1817, after failing to receive national support, New York embarked on the largest
infrastructure project of its time, the Erie Canal. The canal turned out to be a phenomenally29
successful investment. Completed in 1825, it soon returned funds to the state over and above
maintenance costs and interest payments. Now it appeared canals could prove as profitable as
banks. The pattern of state transportation investment, after the Erie success, was influenced by
two factors.
The first was geography. States with access to ocean transportation did not need to build
canals, although they often improved their rivers and built short canals to bring their interior
regions into contact with ports. The real payoff was the construction of interregional canals, like
the Erie, that reached into the northwestern interior. In the late 1820s Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland started canals, all with hopes they would pay for themselves and return a handsome
dividend to the state treasury. Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia contemplated projects that
would open up routes into Tennessee and Kentucky.
The second factor was the youth of western states. Indiana became a state in 1816,
Mississippi in 1817, Illinois in 1818, Alabama in 1819, and Missouri in 1820. Indiana was the
largest of those states in 1820 with a population of just 147,000. It was not until the early 1830s,
that western populations, swelled by rapid population inflows, and western state budgets, spurred
by the rapidly expanding economy and the boom in national land sales, enabled these young
states to contemplate transportation investments of their own. In 1836 and 1837, Indiana,
Illinois, and Michigan started new canals and railroads systems. In the same years, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania committed to expanding their existing systems. Rising western
populations raised land prices; rising land prices stimulated public land sales; increased sale of
public land raised the property tax base; and states began to think they could afford to build
better transportation systems, which would further raise land prices, increase land sales, and30
expand the property tax base. The direction of causation in this story is difficult to disentangle,
but all the factors came together to produce a major economic boom in the 1830s.
Again, the development of transportation investment reflects the interaction of economics
and politics. Both Goodrich and Larson tend to view the timing of state investments as
dependent on federal policy, arguing that states only took up the challenge of building canals
when it became clear that the federal government would not. But there is little support for their
view. Before the War of 1812, almost all of the non-New England states either actively engaged
in transportation investments or were contemplating them. The early model, again, was the
European model, with state chartering of privileged private corporations. That model failed in
the 1790s to produce results. States had begun to consider alternatives before the war. After the
war, state investment picked up again, notably in New York. The Erie canal example (1817)
forced states on the eastern seaboard to move, Pennsylvania and Maryland borrowed and began
construction on their canals in 1825, Maryland was also involved in the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad.
States farther west, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, were simply not in an economic
position to begin transportation investments until the 1830s. There was neither a population nor
tax base in place. In 1835 and 1836 alone, public land sales in Indiana amounted to twice the
taxable acreage in 1834. The land boom represented a fiscal windfall for these states, and they
began investments soon afterward: Indiana in 1836, Illinois and Michigan in 1837.
The boom affected southwestern states as well, but southern states were not in need of
major transportation investments. Their already navigable rivers ran to the sea. In the south,
banks dominated state investments. Louisiana invested $23 million in banks beginning in 1824.31
27Arkansas became a state in 1837 and the first act of the state legislature was to create a
bank capitalized by state bonds.
28Information on state finances in the 1830s and 1840s is available at ICSPR Richard
Sylla, John Legler, and John Wallis “Sources and Uses of Funds in State and Local
Governments, 1790-1915: [United States]”, Data set 1993-05-13.
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida made substantial investments in the early 1830s, while
Mississippi and Arkansas committed millions to banks in 1837 and 1838. More than half of the
banking capital in each of these states by 1837 came from state investment and almost all of the
debt in these states was issued for the purpose of investing in banks (see Table 4).
27 In most
southern banks it was the banks, and not the states, that had the obligation to service the bonds.
Southern voters were willing to support banks, but they had no anticipation that they would have
to pay any taxes to obtain those banks. The history of banking in the east suggested that bank
investments were profitable. Northwestern states needed banks too, Illinois and Indiana made
significant investments in their state banks.
States had always borrowed money to finance long term capital projects. But the pace of
state borrowing increased dramatically in the 1830s. State debts expanded from a few million in
1820, to $80 million in 1830, and $200 million in 1841. The relative size of some of the state
debts is truly amazing. In 1836, Indiana, with a population of roughly 600,000 and a state budget
of $50,000 a year, authorized a bond issue of $10,000,000 in 5 percent bonds. Interest payments
on the bonds alone would come to $500,000 a year, ten times the entire state budget of 1836.
Michigan, with a population of no more than 200,000 and state revenues of $17,000 in 1836,
authorized a bond issue of $5,000,000 of 5 percent bonds in 1837.
28 Total and per capita state
debts outstanding in 1841 are given for each state in Table 5.32
29For a paper that estimates the effect of railroad construction on land values and property
tax revenues in the late 19
th century see Heckelman and Wallis, 1997, and for a direct measure of
canal construction on land values in Indiana in the mid-1830s, see Wallis, 2003.
In 1837, the American economy was hit by a financial panic and in 1839 a depression
began that lasted until 1843. Many of the transportation and banking projects of the western
states were abandoned. Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida
(still a territory), Maryland, and Pennsylvania stopped paying interest payments on their state
bonds in 1841 and 1842. Mississippi and Florida formally repudiated their debts, while
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Michigan ultimately failed to repay part of the money they had
borrowed. Indiana and Illinois worked out a deal with their creditors. Maryland and
Pennsylvania quickly resumed payments on their bonds, and in the end repaid all of the principal
and most of the back interest. New York, Ohio, and Alabama narrowly avoided default.
It is tempting to think of the “canal” boom of the 1830s as the result of naive western
states optimistically thinking they could borrow to build canals, railroads, and banks and live off
the dividends and tolls. Such a view is inconsistent with the history. States had been deeply
involved in the creation of banks and transportation companies since the 1780s. In the case of
banks, state involvement had proven profitable. States who owned stock in banks received
substantial and steady dividends, and those states that taxed banks earned a hefty share of state
revenues from bank revenues. In the case of transportation, until the Erie canal, state
investments had rarely been directly profitable, but there is little reason to doubt that the overall
returns to the state treasury in terms of higher property tax revenues on increased land values
made these good investments.
29 What happened after 1839 was an unexpected economic
depression. Just as the land and economic boom in 1835 and 1836 was fed, in part, by the33
anticipation of state investments in transportation and finance, the bust was caused, in part, by
the realization in 1839 that many states would have trouble repaying their debts.
7, How states reacted
There is no doubt about why states defaulted. As Table 5 shows, nine of the ten states
with the largest per capita debts defaulted, and Alabama, Ohio, and New York narrowly avoided
default. State legislatures throughout the country were asking “how did we get in to this mess?”
and “how can we prevent this from happening again?” Although conditions in every state were
unique, the answers given in the 1840s shared a common theme that echoed the fears of
systematic corruption that had been heard since the revolution. States felt that they had gotten
into trouble because they allowed small, well organized groups to exert a disproportionate
influence in the legislative process. These groups were able to sway democratic legislators and
voters to support their schemes because they promised a significant return to the state in the form
of a bank, canal, or railroad, and at the same time promising taxpayers that they would not have
to foot the bill.
Was this kind of corruption a real problem? Or was the language of corruption (of
systematic corruption) so dominant in political discourse that Americans expressed their concern
over how democracy worked in terms that focused attention on small privileged groups when the
serious problems lay elsewhere? A complete answer to the questions involves detailed
examination of each state, something I can’t venture to do here, but some general observations
seem warranted.
There were cases of systematic corruption. The clearest examples occurred in chartering34
30For an overview of banking in the South see Schwiekart, 1987; for banking in
Mississippi see Bentley, 1978, Brough, 19__, Kilbourne, 2006; for Alabama see Brantley, 1961;
for Arkansas, see Worley, 1950; for an overview of the corruption question in southern banking
see Wallis, 2008.
31The Arkansas constitution still contains a provision preventing the state from ever
repaying the “Holford bonds.”
32Bodenhorn, 2006, is the most recent investigation into New York banking. Benson,
1961, uses the Albany Regency and the adoption of free banking in 1837 as his test case for
understanding Jacksonian democracy. Hofstader, 1969, places Martin Van Buren at the center of
banks in the South, particularly in Real Estate Bank of Arkansas and the Union Bank of
Mississippi.
30 These were cases where a small group had obtained privileges from the state and
resources in the form of state bonds, had used the distribution of those economic resources to
build or enlarge a political coalition, and then had defaulted on the state, leaving taxpayers and
bondholders holding the bag. Systematic corruption played a significant role in explaining why
Arkansas and Mississippi didn’t just default on interest payments for a time, but repudiated their
bonds.
31 The manipulation of bank chartering by Martin Van Buren and the Albany Regency in
New York in the 1820s and 1830s borders on systematic corruption as well (Bodenhorn, 2006).
In most cases, however, states had not been hoodwinked. Deliberation over whether to
build canals was usually a multi-year process, involving different groups and interests, many of
whom had full opportunity to put their case before the people and the legislature. Bank
chartering policy evolved over a number of years and was also the subject of an extended public
debate (Wallis, Sylla, and Legler 1994). The debates were so long lasting that they formed the
basis for informal (or formal in some cases) political parties and organizations. The Albany
Regency was a consciously designed political machine that used control of bank chartering as an
element in funding the party machinery.
32 There were canal Democrats in New York, bank35
the process by which Americans realized that parties were not inherently corrupt, but instead an
inherent part of a democratic society. Leonard, 2002, expands on Hofstader’s themes and
provides a better understanding of how Van Buren and his contemporaries viewed parties.
33Madison wrote a series of articles about parties in the early 1790s, Sheehan, 1992.
Democrats in Indiana, and the canal faction and the railroad faction in Pennsylvania. In most
states, the ongoing debate over internal improvements and banking, provided the structure and
interest for the formation of durable patterns of interests, that were often reflected in nascent
political parties.
In Whig theory, political parties were an anathema to republican government. George
Washington’s farewell address notably pointed to factions and parties as one of the greatest
dangers the new nation faced. Even as Madison and Jefferson organized a political party to
oppose the Federalists, and their Bank of the United States, in the 1790s, they did all that they
could to deny that they were actually forming a party. Madison, in particular, struggled with the
legitimacy of party.
33 When the Whig party formed in the 1830s to oppose the Jacksonian
Democrats, along battle lines laid out by Jackson’s veto of the second Bank of the United State
rechartering and Jackson’s opposition to a national system of internal improvements, one of the
strongest arguments in the Whig arsenal was Jackson’s conscious development of a political
party, something still regarded as inherently systematically corrupt in the political debates of the
1830s. It was no accident that the fault lines in the first two prominent party struggles at the
national level, between the Federalists and Republicans in the 1790s and between the Democrats
and Whigs in the 1830s and 1840s, concerned political promotion of economic development
through government involvement in banks and transportation projects.
Factions and parties were inherently corrupt in Whig theory. As suffrage widened and36
34Ershkowitz and Shade, 1971, examine party differences over a range of issues in early
19
th century state legislatures. Banking and corporation chartering were two of the most divisive
issues, internal improvements somewhat less so.
state governments became more democratic, pressure on state governments to deliver economic
infrastructure intensified. Successful early examples of banking and canal investments raised
expectations that those favorable results could be duplicated in other states. Promoters and
supporters of projects formed natural alliances from which to build political coalitions and
parties.
34 Partisans on both sides, those for or against the bank, canal, or railroad, claimed at the
top of their lungs that the other side was corrupt, that the other side was forming a political party
to subvert democracy.
The clinching feature that often culminated debates about internal improvements turned
out to be taxes. Promoters who could figure a way to package their proposal in a way that did
not involve raising current taxes or that shifted tax burdens away from project opponents and
toward project supporters, e.g. New York, were often able to craft the final compromise that
enabled them to build a coalition sufficient to win legislative support. Americans complained in
the 1840s that unscrupulous promoters had promised them canals and railroads for nothing,
banks and financial services for free, and that somehow they had been tricked into assuming
obligations unknowingly. They cried corruption, but what they had really learned that an
unstructured democracy with simple majority rule decision making processes was liable, indeed
invited, decisions to be made that looked good ex ante but subsequently turned out to be very
expensive.
When states went on their internal improvements borrowing binges in the 1820s and
1830s, they were not acting naively. They based their forward looking expectations on a half37
35Wallis, 2003, examines Indiana, which was one of the largest borrowers in the 1830s
and shows that with very reasonable expectations the state could expect to repay its debts.
century of experience with financing bank and transportation projects.
35 As Americans have
learned again in 2008 and 2009, when a financial crisis hits, investments that looked good and
were good, can suddenly turn disastrous. Something similar happed after 1839. Rather than
blaming the crisis on bad men, states blamed the basic structure of democratic decision making
and so moved to make changes in the way politics and economics interacted. The new
institutions dealt with taxation, borrowing, the creation of organizations (largely corporations),
and the structure of legislation. The states responded to the crisis by making fundamental
changes in their state constitutions that altered their simple democracies into governance
structure with considerably more subtlety and sophistication.
The simplest solution to preventing another crisis like the early 1840s from happening
again was prohibiting government debt altogether. Goodrich took his ironic title, “The
Revulsion Against Internal Improvements,” from Henry Adams’ suggestion that was what
occurred in the 1840s. But the point of Goodrich’s paper was that the wave of constitutional
reforms in the 1840s did not stop states, and certainly not local governments, from continuing to
pursue internal improvements in the 1850s and after the Civil War. States did not close off the
possibility of financing internal improvement projects by borrowing. Instead, they required that
any legislative authorization to borrow new funds be matched with an immediate increase in
taxation that had to approved by the voters, what today are called bond referendums. The
primary aim of the procedural debt restrictions was to pair tax increases with borrowing. Debt
provisions affected the procedures by which debt could be issued rather than imposing absolute38
36A procedural restriction was included in the Rhode Island constitution of 1842, but it
simply required the consent of the people before the state could borrow more than $50,000. Its
essence, but not its details, are the same as in New Jersey. All references to constitutions in the
paper are to Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, as corrected by Wallis, State Constitution
Project.
37The language of the New Jersey clause follows closely the language of an amendment
proposed to the New York constitution in 1842. Adoption of the 1842 amendment was delayed
until the New York constitutional convention in 1846. See the discussion in Gunn, Decline of
Authority.
limits on borrowing.
The first complete debt clause was Article 4, Section 6, Part 4 of the New Jersey
Constitution of 1844:
36
The legislature shall not, in any manner, create any debt or debts, liability or
liabilities, of the State which shall, singly or in the aggregate with any previous debts or
liabilities, at any time exceed one hundred thousand dollars, except for purposes of war,
or to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection, unless the same shall be authorized by a
law for some single object or work, to be distinctly specified therein; which law shall
provide the ways and means, exclusive of loans, to pay the interest of such debt or
liability as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt or liability
within thirty five years from the time of the contracting thereof, and shall be irrepealable
until such debt or liability, and the interest thereon, are fully paid and discharged; and no
such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the
people, and have received the sanction of a majority of all the votes cast for and against it,
at such election; and all money to be raised by the authority of such law shall be applied
only to the specific object stated therein, and to the payment of the debt thereby created.
This section shall not be construed to refer to any money, that has been, or may be,
deposited with this State by the government of the United States.
The New Jersey restrictions were repeated, with alterations, in other states. New Jersey
limited “casual” debt to $100,000.
37 Issue of more debt than that required legislation that
specified the purpose of the debt, and the “ways and means,” i.e. the tax revenues, to service the
debt within thirty five years (such legislation was “irrepealable”). The legislation authorizing the
debt issue could not take effect until it was approved by a majority of the voters in a general39
38Indiana banned all debt issue, while Ohio, and Michigan banned new debt issue for
internal improvements. Issues in Virginia revolved around the apportionment of political power
between the western and eastern parts of the state.
election. The key element in the procedural restrictions was the requirement that the “ways and
means” shall be provided. Legislation authorizing the bond issue had to include new taxes
sufficient to service the debt, and the new taxes had to be approved by the voters. In New York
and Iowa, “ways and means” was replaced with “direct annual tax,” i.e. a property tax. In most
states the property tax would be the tax used to provide revenues.
Table 6 gives the year when states adopted procedural debt restrictions of some type. By
1900 only Delaware, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Arkansas did not have debt restrictions. New England states were, again, different in this regard.
Of the twelve states that revised their constitutions between 1840 and 1851, every state but
Virginia adopted procedural restrictions on debt issue.
38
Procedural restrictions on debt issue dramatically changed the political process for
approving debt issues. By requiring voters to raise their own taxes immediately before any bonds
could be issued, the debt provisions ensured that a political coalition encompassing at least half
the voters had to be put together to secure passage. The next step was to prevent a political
coalition from manipulating interests by creating special privileges for small groups.
The initial wave of constitutional changes directed at special privileges in the 1840s
focused on corporations. A requirement that mandated legislatures pass general incorporation
acts, was tied with a restriction, and in some cases prohibition, on special incorporation. General
incorporation was a administrative procedure which enable individuals to get a corporate charter
by filing the appropriate paperwork and paying a fee. Special incorporation was any charter40
39Many acts of special incorporation did not create corporations that were special in any
way, many corporate charters were virtually identical. What was special about special
incorporation was the legislative grant.
40 New York Constitution, 1846, Article 8, Section 1: “Corporations may be formed under
general laws; but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases
where in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under
general laws. All general laws and special acts pursuant to this section, may be altered from time
to time or repealed.” See the discussion in Gunn, Decline of Authority, pp. 231-232.
41States also began asserting their absolute authority to govern corporations, even after
they had granted corporate charters, special or general: “ All general laws or special acts, enacted
under the provisions of this section may be altered or repealed by the Legislature at any time after
their passage.” (Ohio, 1851, Article 13, section 1).
issued by the legislature.
39 Most (though not all) states required general incorporation and
prohibited special incorporation. In some states special incorporation was explicitly prohibited:
“The General Assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.” (Ohio, 1851,
Article 13, section 1). In other states special incorporation was prohibited “except for municipal
purposes, and in cases where in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the corporation
cannot be attained under general laws.” (Wisconsin, 1848, Article 11, section 1). In these states
the prohibition on special corporations was implicit. New York initially considered a ban on
special incorporation, but in the end adopted language similar to Wisconsin because of the need
to specify special terms in charters for municipalities and, on occasion, the need to grant specific
powers of eminent domain to transportation or communication companies.
40 Banks were
inextricably linked with corporations in the constitutions. While some states banned banks
outright, most states required that banks be incorporated under general laws approved by the
voters (free banking).
41 Table 7 gives the years that states adopted constitutional provisions
making general incorporation acts mandatory.
As the table shows, the New England states were, again, the exception. General41
42Seavoy 1982. There is some doubt about the first general act and whether it was in
Massachusetts, Handlin 1943; Handlin and Handlin, 1945 and 1969; Maier 1992 and 1993.
incorporation acts were legislative acts, not constitutional acts. The constitutional provisions
only required that the legislature pass a general incorporation act. The first general incorporation
act appears to have been passed by New York in 1783, it was an act to incorporate churches.
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New York adopted general incorporation for manufacturing companies in 1810. Massachusetts
established a general regulatory act for banks, which essentially established general incorporation
for banking by 1820. I do not want to imply that general incorporation was an invention of the
1840s, it was clearly not. New England states managed to effect general incorporation through
legislation, and never found it necessary to mandate general incorporation in their constitutions.
But most states found such a mandate necessary.
The third major change also had earlier precedents but first appeared in 1851, when
Indiana adopted a constitutional provision prohibiting the state legislature from passing special
legislation to benefit individuals, in 17 different categories. Some of the categories concerned
legislation that affected individual persons, like acts granting divorces to individuals and
changing the names of individuals. But others acts reflected more general concerns: setting
judicial venues, locating highways, regulating county and township business, providing for the
support of common schools or of school funds. Table 8 presents the dates for prohibitions on
special laws. Some states adopted prohibitions on special laws for specific purposes earlier than
1851, the “partial” restrictions listed in the table. Full restrictions varied somewhat in their
content across states, and not every state adopted them, including many states in New England.
8, Conclusions42
43Tarr, 1998, makes this point and provides a useful summary of the literature on state
constitutions.
The history of state constitutional development often treats the constitutional changes that
began in the 1840s as a continuation of the trend toward limiting the discretion of state
legislatures that began in the 1780s with the adoption of the second national constitution.
43 Since
the changes clearly did limit state legislatures, it is impossible to argue with the general point.
This perspective, however, misses two very important developments in early 19
th century
America. First, on several dimensions state constitutions and political institutions were
becoming more democratic, not less. The excesses of democracy led James Madison to press for
a national veto over state laws at the constitutional convention in 1787. The institutions that led
to the excesses had certainly become stronger, not weaker, over the course of the early 19
th
century. The suffrage had been broadened considerably. Direct election of governors and judges
increased the ability of the electorate to effect changes in policy through the ballot box. Before
the mid-1830s state constitutions were regularly modified to widen the scope of democracy, not
to narrow it.
Americans were continually learning about how democracy worked. The interplay
between politics and economics at the state level continually evolved as states chartered and
invested in banks, chartered and invested in transportation enterprises, and responded to the
demands of voters that they pursue policies that brought prosperity and higher land values to the
average citizen. State politics were intense, and internal improvement debates pitted those who
would gain against those who would pay. The nature of the democratic process itself led to
legislative compromises in which taxes often were not raised at all, or deferred to some hopeful
future.43
The trade-off of lower taxes in return for granting special privileges to small groups was
not a new dilemma in the United States. European governments had faced those trade-offs for
centuries. As the first democracy with wide spread popular inclusion, however, the United States
had to wrestle with how to balance different options for providing public goods that were an
important element in a growing economy. American states made two basic choices. First, they
attempted to remove the possibility of avoiding taxes, forcing voters being wooed by the benefits
of government policies to also take into account the costs of those policies. Second, they opened
access to public support for organizations to everyone without approval of the legislature.
General incorporation came for businesses, but it also came for churches, schools, municipal
governments, and eventually for political parties as well.
As much as guarantees of contract and property, these institutions enable the American
economy to grow and the American polity to develop. None of these changes were preordained
or prefigured by the national constitution in 1787. We must not overlook that the free, open, and
competitive economy Americans managed to create by allowing anyone to form an organization
and enter into almost any line of business, was not a given in early America. The early history of
banking and transportation enterprises illustrate privilege, not open access. Nor should we forget
that an important reason for opening economic access was to solve a political problem of making
democracy work better, not to promote economic growth in an abstract sense. Economics and
politics went together, it was an integral part of the American genius for building institutions.44
Table 1
New or Revised State Constitution Dates






DE 1776,1792 1831 1897
NJ 1776 1844
NY 1777 1821 1846 1894
PA 1776,1790 1839 1874
MD 1776 1851 1864,1867
SC 1776,1790 1861,1865,1868 1896
VA 1776 1830 1850 1864 1870
GA 1777,1789,1798 1861,1865, 1868 1877
NC 1776 1868
KY 1792,1799 1850 1890
TN 1790,1796 1834 1870
AL 1819 1861,1865,1868 1875
MS 1817 1832 1861,1868 1890
LA 1812 1845,1852 1861,1864,1868 1879 1898
OH 1802 1851
IN 1816 1851





MO 1820 1865 1875
AR 1836 1864 1874




1776-1799 1800-1819 1820-1839 1840-1859 1860-1869
CT T,P 1845 0
MA P 1821 P0, T
NH 0
RI P 1842 P-,T
VT 0
DE T
NJ P 1807 T,P 1844 0
NY P 1804 P- 1821 P0 Note Property
Requirements still
applied to blacks after
1821
PA T 1838 T
MD P 1801 P0
SC P,T 1810 P, T0
VA P 1804 P- 1830 P 1850 0
GA T
NC P,T 1835 P-,T 1854 P0, T
KY 0














Note: A “P” denotes a state with a property requirement for voting, a “T” denotes a state with a46
tax paying requirement for voting. The first appearance of state gives a “P,” “T,” or “0" to
denote whether a state had either provision or none when it became a state (or in 1800).
Successive appearances, moving from left to right, indicate whether a state continued the
requirement, “P” or “T”; reduced the requirement “P-“ or “T-“ or eliminated one or both of the
requirments: “P0,” “T0,” or “0.” The dates were taken from Keyssar, 2000.47
Table 3
Time Line for Judicial Elections
ELECTIONS AGAINST ELECTIONS
1777: The territory of Vermont for lower courts
1812: Georgia for “inferior” courts
1816: Indiana for associate circuit court judges
1832: Mississippi (Convention)
1833
1834: Missouri (A), Tennessee (C)
1835: North Carolina (C), Georgia (A)




1844 Iowa for lower courts (Convention) New Jersey (C)
1845 TX (C), LA (C), MO (C)











AL, CT, and VT for circuit court judges (amendments)
Virginia (Convention)
1851: Maryland (Convention) New Hampshire (C)
Indiana (Convention)
1852: Louisiana (Convention)




Taken from Jed Shugerman, The People's Courts: The Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Power in America, manuscript, (2008).48
Table 4
Banks and Bank Capital and
State Investments in Banks in 1837
State Bank
Investment Debt
Capital Bank Share of Share
State Banks Capital per Bank Debt Capital All
Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ME 55 5,226,700 95,031 --- --- ---
NH 27 2,839,508 105,167 --- --- ---
VT 6 510,000 85,000 --- --- ---
MA 123 37,074,690 301,420 --- --- ---
RI 62 9,837,171 158,664 --- --- ---
CT 31 8,744,697 282,087 --- --- ---
NY 98 37,101,460 378,586 --- --- ---
NJ 25 4,142,031 165,681 --- --- ---
PA 49 23,750,338 484,701 --- --- ---
DE 4 818,020 204,505 --- --- ---
MD 21 10,438,655 497,079 --- --- ---
DC 7 2,204,415 314,916 --- --- ---
VA 5 6,731,200 1,346,240 --- --- ---
NC 3 2,525,000 841,667 --- --- ---
SC 10 8,636,118 863,612 --- --- ---
GA 16 11,438,828 714,927 --- --- ---
FL 4 2,046,710 511,678 1,500,000 73% 100%
AL 3 7,572,176 2,524,059 7,800,000 103% 72%
LA 16 36,769,455 2,298,091 22,950,000 62% 97%
MS 9 12,872,815 1,430,313 7,000,000 54% 100%
TN 3 5,092,665 1,697,555 3,000,000 59% 42%
KY 4 7,145,326 1,786,332 2,000,000 28% 27%
MO 1 250,000 250,000 2,500,000 100% 100%
IL 2 2,014,760 1,007,380 3,000,000 149% 26%
IN 1 1,585,481 1,585,481 1,390,000 88% 12%
OH 32 9,247,296 288,978 --- --- ---
MI 9 1,400,000 155,556 --- --- ---
TOTAL 627 293,015,515 467,329
Regional Shares Banks Capital Capital Per
Bank
New England 48% 22% 211,292
Mid Atlantic 33% 27% 384,583
South Atlantic 6% 11% 825,73349
South West 5% 21% 2,009,907
North West 8% 7% 441,69150
Table 5
Total State debt and debt per capita in 1841,
and whether a State defaulted.
State Total Debt Debt PC Default?
1841 1841
FL $4,000,000 $74.07 Y
LA $23,985,000 $68.14 Y
MD $15,214,761 $32.37 Y
IL $13,527,292 $28.42 Y
AK $2,676,000 $27.31 Y
MI $5,611,000 $26.47 Y
AL $15,400,000 $26.06 N
PA $33,301,013 $19.32 Y
MS $7,000,000 $18.62 Y
IN $12,751,000 $18.59 Y
NY $21,797,267 $8.97 N
MA $5,424,137 $7.35 N
OH $10,924,123 $7.19 N
WI $200,000 $6.45 N
SC $3,691,234 $6.21 N
TN $3,398,000 $4.10 N
KY $3,085,500 $3.96 N
ME $1,734,861 $3.46 N
VA $4,037,200 $3.23 N
MO $842,261 $2.19 N
GA $1,309,750 $1.90 N
NH $0 $0.00 N
CT $0 $0.00 N
VT $0 $0.00 N
RI $0 $0.00 N
NC $0 $0.00 N
NJ $0 $0.00 N
DE $0 $0.00 N
Notes: Debt in 1841 and 1880 taken from 1880 Census.51
Table 6







































Delaware, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Arkansas did not52
have a procedural debt restriction in 1900.53
Table 7
Dates that States adopted mandatory General Incorporation laws in their Constitutions
Existing States New States
State Year State Year
Louisiana 1845 Iowa 1846
New York 1846 Wisconsin 1848
Illinois 1848 California 1849
Michigan 1850 Minnesota 1858
Maryland 1851 Oregon 1859
Ohio 1851 Kansas 1861
Indiana 1851 West Virginia 1863
Missouri 1865 Nevada 1864
Alabama 1867 Nebraska 1867
North Carolina 1868 Colorado 1876
Arkansas 1868 North Dakota 1889
Tennessee 1870 South Dakota 1889
Pennsylvania 1874 Montana 1889
New Jersey 1875 Washington 1889
Maine 1875 Idaho 1890
Texas 1876 Wyoming 1890
Georgia 1877 Utah 1896
Mississippi 1890 Oklahoma 1907
Kentucky 1891 New Mexico 1912





As of 1940, only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut did not require
general incorporation laws in their constitutions.
Evans, p. 11, table 5.54
Table 8






Florida 1868 1839 1869
Texas 1869
Illinois 1870 1848 1872
West Virginia 1872
Pennsylvania 1874
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